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STATEMENT OF THE ISSDE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the police have reasonable suspicion to stop defendants1 
vehicle for investigation? 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 77-7-15: 
*A peace officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe 
he has committed or is in the act of committing or 
is attempting to commit a public offense and may 
demand his name, address and an explanation of his 
actions.* 
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IN THE SUPREME CODRT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
GEORGE T. CARPENA AND 
GEORGE AGUILAR, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants were charged with possession of a controlled 
substance (marijuana) with intent to distribute for value. 
In a pre-trial hearing in District Court on July 10, 1985, 
the court ordered that evidence concerning the discovery by the 
police of the marijuana be suppressed. Thereupon the Court 
dismissed the informations against defendants upon defense 
counsels1 motions, since the State had no other evidence against 
defendants. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
While patrolling around 3:00 A.M. in a residential 
neighborhood which had a rash of recent burglaries, the police 
sergeant in charge of the shift spotted defendants1 vehicle 
proceeding at a slow pace. The vehicle had Arizona license 
plates. Sgt. Malmborg followed said vehicle for three blocks, 
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then turned on his red lights. There had been no report to the 
police of a vehicle burglary prior to the stop nor was there a 
criminal or traffic offense observed involving said vehicle. In 
response to the red light, the three occupants of the vehicle 
began moving about, and turning around, continued on for a short 
distance, then pulled into a driveway of one of the occupants1 
residence. 
A pistol was spotted on the floor of the vehicle by one of 
the officers after a few questions on the scene and when none of 
the three occupants would say who owned the vehicle, the sergean 
opened the trunk and found thirty (30) pounds of marijuana 
therein in a garment bag. 
SDMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The sergeant in charge of the night shift had reasonable 
suspicion to make an investigative stop because of: 
1. The lateness of the hour (3:00 A.M.), 
2. The rash of recent vehicle burglaries in that 
neighborhood, 
3. The slow pace of suspect vehicle, and 
4. The out-of-state license plate. 
A slow moving vehicle in such circumstances is suspicious t< 
an experienced officer who is mindful of the spate of recent 
vehicle burglaries in that neighborhood. Such vehicle may be 
casing the neighborhood or is being extra cautious to avoid the 
watchful eye of the law. 
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The United States Supreme Court in similar situations 
sanctioned police action that did not involve the unconstrained 
exercise of discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
The sergeant in charge of the night shift had reasonable 
suspicion to make an investigative stop based on the following 
factors: 
1. The lateness of the hour coupled with 
2. The rash of recent vehicle burglaries in the neighborhood 
coupled with 
3. The suspect vehicle proceeding at a slow pace coupled 
with 
4* The Arizona license plate* 
A slow moving vehicle in such circumstances is suspicious to 
an experienced officer who is mindful of the spate of recent 
burglaries in that neighborhood. Such vehicle may be casing the 
neighborhood or may be careful to avoid the watchful eye of the 
law. 
The Court did not reach the issue of the finding of the 
weapon in the vehicle nor the on-the-scene questioning leading to 
the opening of the trunk containing the marijuana. The Court 
ruled that the stop by the police was not justified so all 
incriminating evidence gained therefrom was suppressed. So only 
the reasonableness of the stop itself is before this court to 
decide. 
-3-
U.S. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. , 85 L. Ed. 2d 605, is 
dispositive of the issue before this court. In that case, 
decided in March 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an 
investigative stop when factors constituting reasonable suspicion 
were skimpier than in this case. In SHARPE, a drug enforcement 
agent for the DEA was on patrol surveilling an area for suspected 
drug trafficking at 6:30 A.M. The agent then noticed a blue 
pickup truck with a camper shell traveling on the highway in 
tandem with a blue Pontiac Bonneville. Observing that the truck 
was riding low in the rear and that the camper did not bounce or 
sway appreciably when the truck drove over bumps or around 
curves, the agent concluded that it was heavily loaded. His 
suspicions were sufficiently aroused to follow the vehicles for 
twenty miles when he decided to make an investigative stop, 
Terry v. OhiOt 392 U.S. 1 (1968) recognized a "narrowly 
drawn" exception to the probable cause requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment for certain seizures of the person that do not rise to 
the level of the full arrests. Thus, when the intrusion is 
minimal, and when law enforcement interests outweigh the privacy 
interests infringed in a TERRY encounter, a stop based on 
objectively reasonable and articulable suspicions, rather than on 
probable cause, is consistent with the Fourth Amendment. 
In SHARPE« Justice Blackman in a concurring opinion voices 
his concern over the sufficiency of reasonable suspicion to make 
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a stop of defendants1 vehicles. He states, "Perhaps the stop of 
a particular type of truck would be reasonable in some areas and 
not others, which is why evidence was submitted on the number of 
such trucks in this area; ...but the Court seems to suggest that 
pickup trucks with camper shells are always, anywhere items 
engendering reasonable suspicion.11 The Justice, however, agreed 
with the decision. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 
59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979) held the random stop of a driver 
unconstitutional because the police simply wanted to check for 
driver's license and registration. The policeman in that case 
stated, "I saw the car in the area and wasn't answering any 
complaints, so I decided to pull them off.11 The Court sanctioned 
in its decision actions "that do not involve the unconstrained 
exercise of discretion... We hold only that persons in 
automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason above have 
their travel and privacy interfered with at the unbridled 
discretion of police officers." 
CONCLDSION 
In light of the statutory provision and the Fourth Amendment 
interpretation, the Court should overrule the District Court 
ruling that the stop was not justified. 
DATED this 26th day of November, 1985. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
^ o vA 
LES DAROCZI 
Deputy Weber Cou 
1 
Attorney 
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